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Abstract
Unicast communication over a network of M -parallel relays in the presence of an eavesdropper
is considered. The relay nodes, operating under individual power constraints, amplify and forward the
signals received at their inputs. In this scenario, the problem of the maximum secrecy rate achievable
with AF relaying is addressed. Previous work on this problem provides iterative algorithms based
on semidefinite relaxation. However, those algorithms result in suboptimal performance without any
performance and convergence guarantees. We address this problem for three specific network models,
with real-valued channel gains. We propose a novel transformation that leads to convex optimization
problems. Our analysis leads to (i) a polynomial-time algorithm to compute the optimal secure AF rate
for two of the models and (ii) a closed-form expression for the optimal secure rate for the other.
I. INTRODUCTION
Wireless communication, by its inherent broadcast nature, is vulnerable to eavesdropping by
illegitimate receivers within communication range of the source. Wyner in [1], for the first
time, information-theoretically addressed the problem of secure communication in the presence
of an eavesdropper and showed that secure communication is possible if the eavesdropper
channel is a degraded version of the destination channel. The rate at which information can be
transferred from the source to the intended destination while ensuring complete equivocation
at the eavesdropper is termed as secrecy rate and its maximum over all input probability
distributions is defined as the secrecy capacity of channel. Later, [2] extended Wyner’s result to
S. Sarma and J. Kuri are with the Department of Electronic Systems Engineering, Indian Institute of Science, Bangalore,
Karnataka - 560012, India (e-mail: {siddharth, kuri}@dese.iisc.ernet.in).
S. Agnihotri is with the School of Computing and Electrical Engineering, Indian Institute of Technology Mandi, Mandi,
Himachal Pradesh - 175001, India (e-mail: samar@iitmandi.ac.in).
ar
X
iv
:1
50
4.
03
14
9v
2 
 [c
s.I
T]
  1
9 A
pr
 20
15
2Gaussian channels. These results are further extended to various models such as multi-antenna
systems [3], [4], multiuser scenarios [5], [6], fading channels [7], [8].
An interesting direction of work on secure communication in the presence of eavesdropper(s)
is one in which the source communicates with the destination via relay nodes [9]–[13]. Such work
has considered various scenarios such as different relaying schemes (amplify-and-forward and
decode-and-forward), constraints on total or individual relay power consumption, one or more
eavesdroppers. However, tight characterization of secrecy capacity or even optimal achievable
rate is not available except for a few specific scenarios.
We consider unicast communication over a network of M parallel relays in the presence of an
eavesdropper. The relay nodes, operating under individual power constraints, amplify and forward
signals received at their inputs. The objective is to maximize the rate of secure transmission from
the source to the destination by choosing the optimal set of scaling factors for the AF-relays.
In general, the problem is non-convex and global optima cannot be guaranteed. However, we
establish that convexification of this optimization problem is possible for degraded eavesdropper
channels scenario where each relay to destination channel gain is larger than the corresponding
relay to eavesdropper channel gain. Though such a scenario is limited, we argue that it may
still provide insights into the nature of the optimal solution for general problem and help us
construct low-complexity capacity achieving achievability schemes. Later, we discuss two special
scenarios: scaled eavesdropper channels and symmetric network and provide a polynomial-time
algorithm and a closed-form solution, respectively, to compute the optimal secure AF rate.
To the best of our knowledge, we are the first to propose a convex optimization based solution
to obtain the global optimum for the degraded channel scenario, where channel gains are real
numbers1. Previously, the problem addressed in this paper was also considered for general channel
scenarios by [11] for a single eavesdropper and [13] for multiple eavesdroppers. However, the
semidefinite relaxation based approaches proposed therein only provide suboptimal performance
without any guarantee on the performance (even for simple network models) and the convergence
of the proposed iterative algorithms. Unlike such previous work, we propose a novel variable
transformation that results in convex optimization for the degraded channel scenario.
Our main contributions are as follows:
1The more general case with complex channel gains is currently under investigation.
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Fig. 1. The diamond M -relay AF network with an eavesdropper
‚ For the degraded eavesdropper channel model, we propose a novel transformation for the
non-convex problem and present an iterative algorithm with guaranteed convergence to
compute the optimal secrecy rate achievable with AF relaying. We also provide a lower-
bound to the optimal rate based on the zero-forcing approach and an upper bound based on
the total relay power constraint.
‚ For the network model with scaled eavesdropper channels, motivated by the greedy ap-
proaches proposed in [14]- [15] to compute the optimal AF rate over diamond networks,
we propose a novel efficient scheme to compute the optimal secrecy rate achievable with
AF relaying.
‚ Finally, for the symmetric network model, we provide a closed form expression for the
optimal secrecy rate achievable with AF relaying, along with the corresponding optimal
vector of scaling factors.
This paper provides some of the key results of our work. Various extensions and detailed
discussions can be found in our ArXiv submission [16].
Organization: Section II introduces the system model and notation. In Section III, we analyze
the optimal AF secrecy rate for three specific network models. The performance of proposed
approaches is evaluated in Section IV. Finally, Section V concludes the paper.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
Consider the Gaussian “diamond” or parallel M -relay network as depicted in Figure 1. The
source node s transmits a message to the destination t with the help of M parallel relays.
However, the signals transmitted by the relays for the destination are also overheard by the
eavesdropper e. The channel inputs at time n P N at the source s and the ith relay are denoted
4by xsrns and xirns, respectively. The channel outputs at time n P N at the destination t, the
eavesdropper e, and the ith relay are denoted by ytrns, yerns, and yirns. These channel inputs
and outputs are related as:
yirns “ hsixsrns ` zirns (1)
ykrns “
Mÿ
i“1
hikxirns ` zkrns, k P tt, eu (2)
where pzirnsqi,n, pztrnsqn, and pzernsqn are independent and identically distributed Gaussian
random variables with zero mean and variance σ2, independent of channel inputs. The channel
gains phsiqMi“1, phitqMi“1, and phieqMi“1 are real numbers, constant over time ( [15], [17]) and known
(even for the eavesdropper channels) throughout the network [10]–[12].
In amplify-and-forward relaying, each relay scales its received signal before transmitting. The
maximum scaling factor at a relay is determined by its individual power constraint. We consider
the following average transmit power constraint:
Erx2i rnss ď Pi, ´8 ă n ă 8, i P ts, 1, 2, . . . ,Mu
Therefore, the channel input at the ith relay can be written as:
xirn` 1s “ βiyirns, (3)
where the scaling factor β is subject to the constraint
0 ď β2i ď β2i,max “ Pi{ph2siPs ` σ2q (4)
Assuming equal delay along each path, for the network in Figure 1, the copies of the source
signal (xsr.s) and noise signals (zir.s), respectively, arrive at the destination and the eavesdropper
along multiple paths of the same delay. Therefore, the signals received at the destination and
eavesdropper are free from intersymbol interference (ISI). Thus, we can omit the time indices
and use equations (1)-(3) to write:
yk “
Mÿ
i“1
hsiβihikxs `
Mÿ
i“1
βihikzi ` zk, k P tt, eu (5)
The secrecy rate at the destination for such a network model can be written as [1], RspPsq “
rIpxs; ydq´ Ipxs; yeqs`, where Ipxs; yq represents the mutual information between random vari-
able xs and y and rus` “ maxtu, 0u. The secrecy capacity is attained for Gaussian channels
5with the Gaussian input xs „ N p0, Psq, where Erx2ss “ Ps, [2]. Therefore, the optimal secrecy
rate achievable with AF relaying can be written as the following optimization problem.
RspPsq “ max
β
rRdpPs,βq ´RepPs,βqs (6a)
“ max
β
„
1
2
log
1` SNRdpPs,βq
1` SNRepPs,βq

, (6b)
where SNRkpPs,βq “ γsΓkpβq, k P tt, eu with
Γkpβq “ phs,k
tβq2
1` βtDkβ , (7)
γs “ Psσ2 , hs,k “ rhs1h1k, hs2h2k, ¨ ¨ ¨ , hsMhMkst, and Dk “ diagprh21k, h22k, ¨ ¨ ¨ , h2Mksq is a MˆM
diagonal matrix with diagonal entries written in vector form.
In the following section, we analyze the optimal secure AF rate problem in (6) for three
specific network models.
III. THE OPTIMAL AF SECRECY RATE ANALYSIS
We discuss the optimal solution of the maximum AF secrecy rate problem (6) in the M -relay
diamond networks with single eavesdropper in degraded eavesdropper channels scenario. Later
we consider two special cases, namely scaled eavesdropper channels and symmetric network.
A. Degraded Eavesdropper Channels
Consider a general channel model where gains along the source to relays and relays to the
destination channels may take arbitrary values. However, the relay to eavesdropper channels are
degraded versions of the relay to destination channels, that is, hit ą hie or he “ αtht, αi ă
1, i P t1, . . . ,Mu.
1) Optimal secrecy rate for individual relay constraints: From equation (6) we can rewrite
an equivalent optimization problem in the following manner:
max
η
max
β
1` SNRdpβq
1` η (8a)
subject to: SNRepβq ď η, (8b)
0 ď β2i ď β2i,max, i P t1, 2, . . .Mu (8c)
6The optimization problem (8) can be solved in two steps. At first, we fix an η and solve the inner
optimization problem for optimal β. We first present an approach to solve the inner optimization
problem, then we address the second step involving the variable η.
We perform the following transformation on the inner optimization (8) to convert the non-
convex problem into a convex one. vi “ ωi{p1`řMi“1 ω2i q 12 or, equivalently ω “ v?1´vtv .
The objective function becomes vthshtsv and it can be shown that it suffices to maximize the
linear objective htsv. The reformulated inner optimization problem is:
max
v
htsv (9a)
subject to: vtCepηqv ď 1, (9b)
vtDiv ď 1, i P t1, 2, . . .Mu, (9c)
where Cepηq “ phephteη Psσ2 ` I´ pDe, phe “ rhs1ρ1, hs2ρ2, . . . , hsMρM st, pDe “ diagprρ21, ρ22, . . . , ρ2M sq
and ρi “ hiehid , @i. Di characterizes the constraint for each relay node and is given by
pDiqmn “
$’’’’’&’’’’’%
1` v
2
i
h2idβ
2
i,max
, if m “ n “ i
1, if m “ n ‰ i
0, otherwise
For the degraded channels ρi ă 1, so Cepηq is a positive semidefinite matrix. As the objective
function is linear and constraints are convex, so the problem in (9) is convex and can be solved
optimally using well-known numerical techniques e.g. interior-point methods.
Once we have obtained the solution for the inner optimization problem over transformed
variable v, then (10) reduces to a one dimensional optimization problem. If we denote the
optimal solution for the inner optimization problem by v˚pηq for a fixed η, then the following
proposition describes the nature of the objection function (8a).
Proposition 1: The objective function fpηq “ 1`phtsv˚pηqq2
1`η is unimodal in η for η P r0,8q.
Proof: Please refer to Appendix A
As fpηq is unimodal, so we can guarantee the convergence to global optima using line search
algorithms (e.g. golden section [18]). Instead of searching over whole positive real line (R`),
we can limit the range of η by further analysis.
7Range of η: As SNR is always positive, so η “ 0 serves as a lower bound. This η value
corresponds to the zero-forcing solution (III-A3) which serves as a lower bound for optimization
problem (8). For upper bound on η, we solve the following optimization problem:
ηmax “ max
β
Γepβq, subject to: βtΛβ ď Ptot “ P1 ` . . .` PM
where Λ “ diagrh2s1Ps`σ2, h2s2Ps`σ2, ¨ ¨ ¨ , h2sMPs`σ2s. The constraint considered here is total
power constraint and corresponds to a larger feasible solution space as compared to individual
constraints. Therefore, ηmax calculated here is an over estimate of the maximum value of η
with individual constraints. The solution of this problem is ηmax “ hs,etD˜´1e hs,e, where D˜e “
1
Ptot
Λ`De.
Along with the solution of the optimal AF secrecy rate in this setting, we also provide
upper and lower bounds on the optimal rate. For upper bound, we replace the individual power
constraint on each relay by a single total power constraint on β vector. For lower bound, we
consider the zero forcing solution [10], [13], where β values are chosen such that the transmitted
signals get canceled at eavesdropper.
2) Optimal secrecy rate for the total power constraint: From equation (6) the total power
constraint optimization problem can be expressed in following manner:
max
η
max
β
1` SNRdpβq
1` η (10a)
subject to: SNRepβq ď η, (10b)
βtΛβ ď Ptot, (10c)
One can check that the total power constraint (10c) results in larger feasible solution space
as compared to (4). Therefore, the optimal objective function value obtained will upper bound
the original individual constraint problem (8). Using the transformation described above, we can
reformulate the optimization problem in the following manner:
max
v
htsv (11a)
subject to: vtCepηqv ď 1, (11b)
vtDTv ď 1 (11c)
8where DT “ diagprζ1, ζ2, ¨ ¨ ¨ , ζM sq, ζi “ p1 ` h2siPs`σ2h2idPtot q. As DT is a diagonal matrix with
positive diagonal elements, so (11c) is a convex constraint. This problem can be solved in a
manner similar to the one for the individual power constraint.
3) Zero forcing for individual constraints (η “ 0): In this approach we equate SNRe to
zero while maximizing SNRd. By imposing this extra constraint we are reducing the feasible
solution space, therefore, the solution obtained will provide a lower bound to original problem.
The optimal secure AF rate problem for this case can be written as:
max
β
Ps
σ2
´řM
i“1 hsiβihit
¯2
1`řMi“1pβihitq2 (12a)
subject to
Mÿ
i“1
hsiβihie “ 0, (12b)
´ βi,max ď βi ď βi,max (12c)
We reformulate it as the following quadratic program.
Proposition 2: The problem in (12) is equivalent to the following quadratic program which
can be solved efficiently
max
w
wtw, subject to: Hw “ r1 0st, Hβw ď 0
Proof: Please refer to Appendix B.
Remark 1: As this formulation does not rely on the degradedness assumption, it can be used for
general channels also.
B. Scaled Eavesdropper Channels
Scaled eavesdropper scenario is a special case of degraded channel scenario. Here, all the
elements of vector α have same value, i.e. αi “ α ă 1, i P t1, . . . ,Mu. Therefore, eavesdropper
channel can be expressed as he “ αht. Though the approach discussed in the last section can
be used to solve the optimal AF secrecy rate problem corresponding to this network model,
here we propose another scheme that better exploits the corresponding channel properties, thus
resulting in a more efficient implementation. Before going to details, we provide an overview
of the proposed solution to the scaled eavesdropper problem.
91) Due to the structure of the optimization problem we identify that a common function is
present in both numerator and denominator and maximizing that function will result in
maximization of the original problem.
2) Consider a new variable ωi “ hidβi, its upper bound ωi,max “ hidβi,max, and a new
parameter gsi “
b
Ps
σ2
hsi, i P t1, 2, . . . ,Mu. Now we relaxed the derived optimization
problem by replacing all the individual constraint by a single total constraint which can
be solved efficiently.
Original: max fpωq “
˜
Mÿ
i“1
gs,iωi
¸2
subject to: ωi ď ωi,max i P t1, 2, . . . ,Mu
Relaxed:max
˜
Mÿ
i“1
gs,iωi
¸2
subject to:
Mÿ
i“1
ω2i “ r2
Here, r2 P r0, ||ω||2s
3) If the solution of this relaxed problem satisfy individual constraints, then we have solved
the problem optimally.
4) If the solution of that total constraint problem violates individual constraints, then we have
to impose the individual constraint criteria to obtain the solution. In other words, some
of the variables have reached their boundary value and others are still inside constraint
region. The question is how to identify the variables that have reached their respective
upper bounds?
Let us begin with the obvious scenario, where r2 “ ||ωmax||2. The solution is trivial i.e.
ωi “ ωi,max, @t1, 2, . . . ,Mu. Now, if we want to reduce δ from all the variables, how
should we proceed so that objective is least effected. Consider, 0 ď θi ď 1 and ř
i
θi “ 1.
If we reduce δθi from each variable, then for δ Ñ 0, neglecting δ2, the rate of change in
objective function with respect to r2 can be written as:
df
dr2
“
ÿ
i
Bf
Bωi {
Br2
Bωi “
ÿ
i
θi
gs,i
ωi,max
ě gs,i˚
ωi˚,max
where i˚ “ arg min
i
gs,i
ωi,max
Therefore, we should reduce the variable ωi˚ , to keep the rate of decrement of the ob-
jective function minimum. We can keep reducing ωi˚ only till
gs,i˚
ωi˚
“ gs,j˚
ωj˚,max
, where
j˚ “ arg minj‰i gs,jωj,max . From that point onwards variables ωi˚ and ωj˚ both has least
effect on objective function among all variables and, therefore, we keep reducing them
10
jointly till we reach gs,k˚
ωk˚,max
, where k˚ “ arg mink‰i,j gs,kωk,max and it continues in similar
manner.
From the above discussion one can conclude that an ordering among the variables are pos-
sible depending on their contribution towards objective function. Variables that contributes
more towards objective function have higher tendency of violating individual constraints
as compared to other variables. So, we sort the variables in descending order based on
there gs,i
ωi,max
value and re-index them in following manner:
gs,p1q
ωp1q,max
ě gs,p2q
ωp2q,max
ě ¨ ¨ ¨ ě gs,pMq
ωpMq,max
Due to re-indexing, we can say that ωpiq has higher tendency of violating individual
constraint than ωpi`1q. Now, we can divide the range r0, ||ωmax||2s based on this ordering.
An interval rr2m, r2m`1s is defined in following manner:
r2m “
mÿ
i“1
ω2piq,max `
ω2pmq,max
g2s,pmq
Mÿ
i“m`1
g2s,piq
In simple words, within this interval variables indexed by p1q to pmq has reached their
upper bounds and we need to solve the total constraint problem for rest of the variables.
5) We argue that the solution for each of these subproblems within an interval can be obtained
by solving a one-dimensional maximization problem.
6) We choose the solution that maximizes the original objective function over those sub-
intervals.
We rewrite the achievable AF secrecy rate in terms of ω:
Rspωq “ 1
2
log
„
1` %1Ψpωq
1` %2Ψpωq

,
where Ψpωq “
´řM
i“1 gsiωi
2¯
, %1 “ 11`r2 , and %2 “ α
2
1`α2r2 with
řM
i“1 ω
2
i “ r2. So, in this setting
the problem in (6) is:
RspPsq “ max
ω
Rspωq (13)
In the rest of this subsection we provide an approach to efficiently compute the optimal
solution of the problem in (13) and then summarize it in an algorithm.
Note that a non-zero secrecy rate can be obtained only if α ă 1. Thus, %1 ą %2. This implies
that 1`%1Ψpωq
1`%2Ψpωq is maximized when Ψpωq is correspondingly maximized. To maximize Ψpωq, we
11
formulate the following problem:
max
˜
Mÿ
i“1
gsiωi
¸2
subject to
Mÿ
i“1
ω2i “ r2 (14)
It is easy to prove that the optimal ωprq vector for this problem is equal to ωprq “ gs||gs||r. By
replacing this in the secrecy rate equation (13) along with the sum constraint we formulate the
following optimization problem in r:
max
r
1` ||gs||2r2
1`r2
1` α2||gs||2r2
1`α2r2
(15)
Lemma 1: The optimal solution to the problem in (15) is r˚ “ p
b
α
a
1` ||gs||2q´1.
Proof: By differentiating the objective function of (15) with respect to r and then it equating
to 0, we get the solution.
Now, if gs||gs||r
˚ satisfy individual constraints of ωi then this is the optimal solution, else we
must consider the next step that considers scenarios where the solution obtained using above
method violates any of the ωi’s constraints.
Arrange ωi’s according to gsiωi,max and denote them as ωp1q ě . . . ě ωpMq. The gsi are ordered
accordingly with the ordered values denoted as gs,piq. Then, we divide the feasible set of the
problem in (14) in M non-overlapping subsets, rrm, rm`1s, m P t0, . . . ,M´1u. The interval that
results in the largest value of the problem in (13) solved over it as discussed below, is chosen
as the one that results in the optimal solution of (13) over all intervals and the corresponding
optimal vector of scaling factors β˚. The correctness of this approach follows from an argument
similar to the one in [14, Lemma 1].
For the ease of exposition, define pm “ řmi“1 gs,piqωpiq,max, qm “ řmi“1 ω2piq,max, and sm “řM
i“m`1 g
2
s,piq.
The intervals can be calculated as follows. The first interval is r0, r1s, where r1 corresponds to
the value at which the first variable (after ordering) is equal to its upper bound. Therefore, ω˚ “
gs
||gs||r1 “ hs||hs||r1 and ωp1q,max “
gs,p1q
||gs|| r1. Thus, r1 “ ||gs||gs,p1qωp1q,max “
b
ps1{g2s,p1qqω2p1q,max` q1.
Similarly, rm “
b
psm{g2s,pmqqω2pmq,max` qm, mPt1, . . . ,M´ 1u and rM “ qM .
Remark 2: If 0 ď r ď r1, then we can obtain the optimal scaling vector using the solutions of
(14) and (15).
Consider evaluating (13) over the interval rrm, rm`1s. In this stage the first m ordered variables
have reached their respective boundaries. These variables are replaced by their respective upper
12
bounds. For the rest of the variables we search for their respective optimum values as discussed
next.
The part of the objective function in (14) depending on variables rωpm`1q, . . . , ωpMqs can be
upper bounded as:
gts,tpm`1q,¨,pMquωtpm`1q,¨,pMqu ď λm||gs,tpm`1q,¨,pMqu||
for all ||ωtpm`1q,¨,pMqu|| “
a
r2 ´ qm,
where utpm`1q,¨,Mu :“ rupm`1q, ¨ ¨ ¨ , upMqst and λm ą 0. In other words, the objective function is
maximized when the vector variables rωpm`1q, . . . , ωpMqst lies in the direction of rgs,pm`1q, ¨ ¨ ¨ , gs,pMqst
vector. Therefore, we have to find the optimal scaling factor λm for those variables. Replacing
the first m ordered variables by their respective upper bounds and rest of them by a scaled vector
of gs,tpm`1q,¨,pMqu, we obtain the following optimization problem in terms of λm.
max
λm:λmą0
1` γs ppm`smλmq21`qm`smλ2m
1` γs α2ppm`smλmq21`α2qm`α2smλ2m
The solution to the above problem can be calculated by solving the following degree-4
polynomial equation:
p1` qmqp1` α2qmq
s2mα
2p1` γssmq ´
pmpγsp2mα2 ` 2qmα2 ` α2 ` 1q
s2mα
2p1` γssmq λm
´ 3p
2
mγs
smp1` γssmqλ
2
m ´ pmp2` 3γssmqsmp1` γssmq λ
3
m ´ λ4m “ 0 (16)
The coefficients of this equation are all negative except the first one. Using the Descartes’ rule
of sign there is only one positive root as there is only one variation in sign of the coefficients.
Given that 0 ă λm, it is the desired solution. Note that, if λm ą wpm`1q,max{gs,pm`1q, then the
solution will not belong to predefined sub-interval p7 r2m`1 “psm`1{g2s,pm`1qqω2pm`1q,max` qm`1 ă
λmsm`1` qm`1q.
We summarize the whole procedure in Algorithm 1.
C. Symmetric Network
A special case of the general s ´ t and s ´ e diamond networks introduced above is the
symmetric setting, where hsi “ hs, hit “ ht, hie “ he and Pi “ PR, i P t1, . . . ,Mu. In this
13
Algorithm 1 Algorithm for Scaled Eavesdropper Channel
Input: α, gs, ωi,max, P , σ2
Output: ω˚
1: Calculate r˚ “ 1b
α
?
1`||gs||2
and evaluate ω “ gs||gs||r˚.
2: if ωi ď ωi,max, i P t1, . . . ,Mu then
3: ω˚ “ ω (Lemma 1) and exit.
4: else
5: Sort ωis according to gsiωi,max in the descending order.
6: for m “ 1 to M ´ 1 do
7: Solve polynomial equation (16) to calculate the λm.
8: Evaluate ωm using λm corresponding to interval rrm, rm`1s starting from first i for
which λi ă wpi`1q,max{gs,pi`1q. Denote that i as i0.
9: end for
10: ω˚ “ ωm˚, ωm˚ maximizes the solution of (13) over all ωm, m P ti0, . . . ,M ´ 1u.
11: end if
setting, for a given vector of scaling factors, β “ pβ1, . . . , βMq, the achievable AF secrecy rate
is:
Rspβq“ 1
2
log
»———–
¨˚
˚˝˚
1`
γ
1
s
ˆ
Mř
i“1
βi˙
2
ν `
Mř
i“1
β2i
‹˛‹‹‚
N¨˚˚˚
˝1`
γ
1
s
ˆ
Mř
i“1
βi˙
2
µ`
Mř
i“1
β2i
‹˛‹‹‚
fiffiffiffifl,
where γ 1s “ γshs, ν “ h´2t , and µ “ h´2e . Note that Rspβq is non-zero only if ν ă µ, i.e. ht ą he.
Thus, using (6), the optimal secure AF rate problem in this setting is:
RspPsq “ max
β
Rspβq (17)
Proposition 3: For the symmetric M -relay diamond network, the optimum scaling factors for
all relays are equal, i.e. β1˚ “ β2˚ “ ¨ ¨ ¨ “ βM˚ “ β˚.
Proof: Please refer to Appendix C.
Corollary 1: For symmetric M relay diamond network, the optimal value of the scaling factor
14
for each relay is:
β˚ “
$’’&’’%
„
σ2
PRM2h2th
2
e
1{4
β1{2max,
σ2
PRβ2max
ăM2h2th2e
βmax, o.w.
Proof: Using Proposition 3, the optimal AF secrecy rate problem in (6) is reduced in this
case to the following single parameter optimization problem:
max
β:0ďβ2ďβ2max
ˆ
1` Ps
σ2
M2β2h2sh
2
t
1`Mβ2h2t
˙Nˆ
1` Ps
σ2
M2β2h2sh
2
e
1`Mβ2h2e
˙
With the parameters: hsr “
?
Mhs, hrd “
?
Mht, and hre “
?
Mhe, this problem reduces to
the single relay AF secrecy rate maximization problem, addressed in Lemma 2 below.
Lemma 2: The optimal AF scaling factor for single AF relay network is:
βAF “
$’’&’’%
„
σ2
PRh2rdh
2
re
1{4
β1{2max,
σ2
PRβ2max
ă h2rdh2re
βmax, o.w.
Proof: Please refer to Appendix D.
Remark 3: One can obtain an upper bound on secrecy rate for degraded channel scenario
(III-A) by using the result of symmetric channel scenario. For example, if we form a M relay
symmetric network by considering hs “ maxthsu, ht “ maxthtu and he “ mintheu, where
maxtxu and mintxu denotes the maximum and minimum element of vector x, respectively.
IV. RESULTS
To evaluate the performance of the scheme proposed in subsection III-A, consider a network
whose main channel gains are sampled from a Rayleigh distribution with parameter 0.5. The
degraded channels for eavesdroppers is obtained by multiplying a factor („ Uniformr0, 1s) with
the relay to destination channel gain. We average the results of 1000 such network instances
while plotting the graphs.
In Figure 2 we plot the variation of the optimal AF secrecy rate with respect to the source
power (Ps) for the degraded eavesdropper channels. The zero-forcing lower bound and the total
power constraint upper bounds are also plotted.
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Fig. 2. Plot of the optimal secrecy rate (Rs˚ ) versus source power (Ps) for five relay node diamond network using the scheme
proposed in subsection III-A. Here we consider Pr “ 5 and σ2 “ 1.
V. CONCLUSION
The problem of maximizing the rate of secure unicast transmission over a network of parallel
AF relays in the presence of an eavesdropper is considered. Unlike previous work that provides
iterative algorithms with suboptimal performance without any performance and convergence
guarantees, our work provides either a closed-form expression or polynomial-time algorithm to
compute the optimal secure AF rate for three specific network models considered. In future, we
plan to investigate optimum secrecy rate of general AF networks.
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APPENDIX A
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 1
Proof: In optimization problem (9), the individual constraints (9c) are independent of η. If a
vector x1 satisfies the constraint (9b) for η1, then x1 will satisfy it for η2 ą η1. 1 ě xt1Cepη1qx1 “
pphtex1q2
η1
Ps
σ2
` xt1Dex1 ą pphtex1q2η2 Psσ2 ` xt1Dex1 “ xt1Cepη2qx1, here De “ I ´ pDe. In fact, as η
increases feasible set for (9b) also increases. As a result the feasible set for optimization problem
(9) also increases. Therefore, phtsv˚pη1qq2 ď phtsv˚pη2qq2. Recall that, η “ 0 corresponds to zero-
forcing solution (Sec. III-A3) and, therefore, fpηq increase with η initially. But later constraint
(11c) become active and constrain the feasible set. As a result, the numerator of fpηq remains
fixed, whereas, denominator increases with η. This results in decrease of fpηq.
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APPENDIX B
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 2
Proof: It can be shown that the optimal solution does not change if we rewrite the objective
function as min 1`
řM
i“1pβihidq2
přMi“1 hsiβihidq2 , because
řM
i“1 hsiβihid ‰ 0. If we consider a new variable v
such that
řM
i“1 hsiβihid “ v, then in terms of variable vector w “ rωv t, 1v st, we can easily
write a quadratic optimization problem. The denominator of the objective function (12a) can
be written as a constraint in terms of this variable vector as, rhts, 0sw “ 1. The eavesdropper
constraint can be expressed as rphte, 0sw “ 0. We combine them as matrix H and write as equality
constraint. Hβ can be obtained by rearranging the following constraint: ´hd,iβi,maxwM`1 ď wi ď
hd,iβi,maxwM`1, @i.
APPENDIX C
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 3
Proof: Taking derivative of Rs with respect to βi, we get
2γ1s
#´ Mÿ
i“1
β2i ´ βi
´ Mÿ
j“1
βj
¯¯´
2
Mÿ
i“1
β2i ` ν ` µ
¯
´
´ Mÿ
i“1
β2i
¯2 ´ γ1sβi´ Mÿ
j“1
βi
¯3 ` νµ+´ Mÿ
j“1
βi
¯´
µ´ ν
¯
“ 0
Now, as
˜
Mř
j“1
βi
¸
“ 0 is not the optimal solution and µ ‰ ν, hence
˜
Mÿ
i“1
β2i ´ βi
˜
Mÿ
j“1
βj
¸¸˜
2
Mÿ
i“1
β2i ` ν ` µ
¸
´
˜
Mÿ
i“1
β2i
¸2
´ γ1sβi
˜
Mÿ
j“1
βi
¸3
` νµ “ 0 (18)
Similar equation can be obtained if we take derivative with respect to βj, j ‰ i and j P
t1, 2, . . . ,Mu. Subtracting this equation from equation (18) we get
pβi ´ βjq
˜
Mÿ
j“1
βj
¸$&%
˜
2
Mÿ
i“1
β2i ` ν ` µ
¸
` γ1s
˜
Mÿ
j“1
βi
¸3,.- “ 0 (19)
Hence, βi “ βj, i, j P t1, 2, . . . ,Mu
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APPENDIX D
PROOF OF LEMMA 2
For single relay network the problem is:
βAF “ argmax
β
ˆ
1` Ps
σ2
h2srβ
2h2rd
1` β2h2rd
˙Nˆ
1` Ps
σ2
h2srβ
2h2re
1` β2h2re
˙
Differentiating the objective function with respect to β and setting the derivative equal to zero,
we get for the optimum β value
β4 “
„
σ2
PRh2rdh
2
re

β2max
Further, given that the maximum value that β can take is bounded from above by βmax and the
monotonic increasing nature of the objective function from β “ 0 to β “ βmax, we obtain the
desired result.
